Abstract

In this book Dummett develops the view of his essay "Truth" that a full development of the Wittgensteinian "meaning-as-use" view of language will displace truth from its central position in the philosophy of language in favor of verifiability. He adds the provision, however, that one must first liberalize the extreme constructivism in favor of a suitably nonpsychologistic intuitionism. His view gradually emerges in a careful reconstruction and criticism of the most viable and coherent of Frege’s positions in philosophic logic. In the process the views of Russell, Quine, Geach, Strawson, and Wittgenstein are measured, winnowed, and assessed; even Kripke’s recent claims about names and identity are dismissed in an appendix, though this is one of the few parts of the book that does not seem to compel agreement. Though undoubtedly the most masterful book ever written about Frege, and a joy to read, one can hardly call it a definitive intellectual biography: there is only one direct quote from Frege and no footnotes. But it just may be the most solid and brilliant reflection currently available on the core philosophic problems of the last hundred years.—J.L.