Rorty on Realism and Constructivism

Metaphilosophy 36 (3):272-294 (2005)
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Abstract

This article argues that we can and should recognize the mind dependence, epistemic dependence, and social dependence of theories of mind-independent reality, as opposed to Rorty, who thinks not even a constructivist theory of mind-independent reality can be had. It accuses Rorty of creating an equivocation or "dualism of scheme and content" between causation and justification based on various "Davidsonian" irrelevancies, not to be confused with the actual Davidson. These include the 'principle of charity', the attack against conceptual schemes, the linguistification of social practice, intersubjectivism, and causal naturalism. It follows that realists and constructivists need neither follow Rorty's mischaracterizations nor succumb to his internal paradoxes

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James Stieb
Drexel University

Citations of this work

Moral Realism and Kantian Constructivism.James A. Stieb - 2006 - Ratio Juris 19 (4):402-420.
Is Rorty a linguistic idealist?Tomáš Marvan - 2011 - Human Affairs 21 (3):272-279.

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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