Consciousness, intentionality, and function: What is the right order of explanation?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200 (1995)
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Abstract

I examine and criticize John Searle's view of the relationships between consciousness, intentionality and function.

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Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod

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