Abstract

Scholars disagree on how to interpret two terms, ‘intellect’ and ‘as’, in the definition of attribute given by Spinoza in his Ethics and thus divide themselves into two rival camps: one is known as the subjective interpretation, and the other, objective interpretation. In this essay, I argue that both interpretations are problematic in one way or another, and a better interpretation should take a middle path between the subjective and objective. By this new interpretation, ‘intellect’ should be understood as infinite and finite intellects, and ‘as’ to be ‘as in fact’. Therefore, what the definition of attribute really means is that infinite and finite intellects are equally capable to perceive the essence of substance through attribute; attribute is a reliable medium through which infinite and finite intellects perceive substance as in fact constituting its essence. Furthermore, this interpretation sheds light on three other questions associated with Spinoza’s ontology: whether there is any ontological difference between substance and attribute; how many attributes there are; and whether there are real distinctions between attributes. Altogether, the new interpretation of attribute provides a new understanding of Spinoza’s ontology.