The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and Alan Musgrave argue that it is impossible to precisely date discovery events and precisely identify discoverers. They defend this claim mainly on the grounds that so-called discoverers have in many cases misconceived the objects of discovery. In this paper, I argue that Kuhn and Musgrave arrive at their view because they lack a substantive account of how well discoverers must be able to conceptualize discovered objects. I remedy this deficiency by providing just such an account, and with this account I delineate how one can secure precision regarding the identity of discoverers and the times of discoveries. Near the end of my paper I bring my target of criticism up-to-date; it turns out that Steve Woolgar adopts an approach to discovery kindred to those of Kuhn and Musgrave and I close the paper by discussing what is at stake in rebutting him
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/52.1.75
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Science, the Very Idea.Steve Woolgar - 1988 - Tavistock Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Scientific Discovery: That-What’s and What-That's.Samuel Schindler - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
Discovery in Science and in Teaching Science.Nahum Kipnis - 2007 - Science & Education 16 (9-10):883-920.

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Herbert Simon's Computational Models of Scientific Discovery.Stephen Downes - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:97-108.
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