Quantifier Variance Without Meaning Variance

Axiomathes 30 (3):313-325 (2020)
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Abstract

Quantifier variance entails that ‘there exists’ has a variety of meanings. Determining what makes all these meanings quantifier meanings is a problem associated with this view. A reasonable candidate suggested by Hirsch is the set of formal rules governing quantification. However, the collapse argument presents a notorious objection to the viability of the candidate: there cannot be more than one quantifier obeying the same rules up to logical equivalence. It is proposed that a quantifier variantist who intends to retain Hirsch’s proposed solution can admit a many-sorted language in order to block the collapse argument. Within the many-sorted language, a Kaplanian thesis about the rules governing sorted quantifiers saves quantifier variance from meaning variance.

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Davood Hosseini
Tarbiat Modares University

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References found in this work

On The Plurality of Worlds.Graeme Forbes - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):222-240.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Ontological Pluralism.Jason Turner - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (1):5-34.
Quantifier variance and realism.Eli Hirsch - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):51-73.
Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes, and common sense.Eli Hirsch - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):67–97.

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