Realism, liberal moralism and a political theory of modus vivendi

European Journal of Political Theory 9 (4):431-448 (2010)
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Abstract

This article sets out some of the key features of a realist critique of liberal moralism, identifying descriptive inadequacy and normative irrelevance as the two fundamental lines of criticism. It then sketches an outline of a political theory of modus vivendi as an alternative, realist approach to political theory. On this account a modus vivendi should be understood as any political settlement that involves the preservation of peace and security and is generally acceptable to those who are party to it. In conclusion, some problems with this conception of modus vivendi and with a realist political theory more generally are discussed. In particular, the question is raised of whether a realist political theory should be understood as an alternative to liberal moralism or only a better way of doing basically the same kind of thing

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Citations of this work

Realism in Normative Political Theory.Enzo Rossi & Matt Sleat - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (10):689-701.
Political normativity and the functional autonomy of politics.Carlo Burelli - 2022 - European Journal of Political Theory 21 (4):627-649.
Political Realism as Methods not Metaethics.Jonathan Leader Maynard - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (3):449-463.
Radicalizing realist legitimacy.Ben Cross - 2019 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 46 (4):369-389.

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Democracy and Disagreement.Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson - 1996 - Ethics 108 (3):607-610.
A Qualified Defence of Oakeshott’s Politics of Scepticism.John Horton - 2005 - European Journal of Political Theory 4 (1):23-36.
A Note from the Editor.[author unknown] - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (1):3-4.

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