Abstract

Kant's Critical philosophy held that the mind is the form of experience, which is brought to bear on content that is given to the form from a standpoint outside the confines of the form itself. Once a form/content distinction has been assumed, however, the truth status of propositions within the system can only be maintained by claiming that they somehow conform to the form that makes those propositions possible as propositions-- that the proposition in question can only be understood from within the confines of the form . This has the effect of rendering the form itself immune to critique, since it is the form that makes discursive analysis possible . The problem is that Kant did not adhere to a coherence theory of truth--but neither can he claim to defend a correspondence theory of truth. Both theories of truth are not tenable from within the critical philosophy: Kant concedes that coherence alone cannot guarantee the truth of propositions--but this does seem to be all that he is left with, because it is impossible for him to maintain a correspondence theory, since all perceptions or intuitions are already within the confines of the form. Thus, the correspondence between thought and being necessary for the correspondence theory of truth to be tenable simply is a moot issue, since no correspondence can be established between the form and the content . Fichte sought to ground consciousness by appealing to a fact that is not within the confines of the circle of consciousness. Fichte therefore inquires into the condition that makes all discursive judgment possible: That of the necessity of the consciousness of freedom. This will become Fichte's first principle, since it describes a correspondence upon which a system of propositions can cohere.