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Suggestions for Further Reading
In Meaning and Mystery. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 214–221 (2010)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Asking for Reasons Narrative Framing Alternative Narratives Revelation and Reason Mystery Notes.
Believing in God ‐ does anyone actually believe frustrating to talk about ‐ where thinking about important issues differs from one's own good reasons to believe in God asking for reasons ‐ encountering beliefs that seem puzzling or doubtful narrative framing ‐ understanding judgments that people make alternative narratives ‐ reflecting on life‐orienting narratives that persuade us revelation and reason making sense of things ‐ dimension of reality beyond ordinary empirical observation treating God as an empirical hypothesis disbelief in God and rejection of life stories as a guide to life
My notes
Similar books and articles
Front Matter.David M. Holley - 2010 - In Meaning and Mystery. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 1–10.
Giving Reasons Does Not Always Amount to Arguing.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):659-668.
Giving Reasons Does Not Always Amount to Arguing.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):659-668.
Why Thinking Critically is Important.John Capps & Donald Capps - 2009 - In You've Got to be Kidding! Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 1–12.
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Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.
A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.
The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.
Deflationary Pluralism about Motivating Reasons.Daniel Fogal - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
Can the Epistemic Basing Relation be a Brain Process?Dwayne Moore - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (2):1-19.
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