Defending the Subjective Component of Susan Wolf's "Fitting Fulfillment View" About Meaning in Life

Abstract

In this essay, I intend to analyze and respond to criticism directed towards the subjective component of Susan Wolf’s Bi-partite “Fitting Fulfillment View”, criticism directed from Thaddeus Metz, Ben Bramble, and Aaron Smuts. Wolf offers a theory about meaning in life which considers both that the subject should find it meaningful and that the source of this meaningfulness should be objectively valuable. However, critics have argued that a subject’s attitude towards meaningfulness should not affect whether one’s life is meaningful or not. Out of the critics I found promising and responded to I did not find any that seriously threatened Wolf’s theory and, in some cases they even seem to misunderstand Wolf’s claim. In the final section, I raise a question for Wolf’s account that I believe would be interesting to pursue in a further study.

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References found in this work

Well-being.Roger Crisp - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Meaning of Life (Textbook).Thaddeus Metz - 2015 - In Duncan Pritchard (ed.), What is This Thing Called Philosophy? New York: Routledge. pp. 319-358.
The Meaning of Life.Thaddeus Metz - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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