The Intellectuals and the Virtues

Ethics 126 (1):7-36 (2015)
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Abstract

A virtuous person has a distinctive grasp of what is important in the light of which she chooses what to do. In what does this grasp consist? According to the intellectual tradition, moral virtue requires you always to be able to have an explicit, conscious grasp of the reasons why your action is right. Recently, this view has been defended by Julia Annas. I do not think that her argument establishes her conclusion, and I provide further defense of intellectualism, finishing with some conclusions about the importance of moral philosophy

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2015-09-29

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Alison Hills
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Making Sense of Things: Moral Inquiry as Hermeneutical Inquiry.Paulina Sliwa - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation.Alison Hills - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):399-414.
Moral worth and skillful action.David Horst - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):657-675.
Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity.Michel Croce - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):373-389.

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References found in this work

Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
On the epistemic costs of implicit bias.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):33-63.

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