Procedural Autonomy: An Account of Autonomy Compatible with Contingency
Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo (
1992)
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Abstract
This dissertation is dedicated to developing a principle of autonomy that is suited to human rational agents situated in particular and contingent settings. In doing so, I start out by examining a very influential conception of autonomy which defines autonomy in terms of an agent's ability to "transcend" her particular and contingent life-situation. I call such a conception of autonomy deontological autonomy. I argue that there is an inherent inconsistency in the deontological approach since deontological autonomy cannot accommodate the inescapable contingency in the concrete and particular life of each individual. I propose the notion of procedural autonomy as a more plausible conception of autonomy for humans, since it is achievable in one's particular and concrete setting. ;What makes us procedurally autonomous in contingent human conditions is the process of critical deliberation which consists of two stages: The first stage requires that an agent should examine hierarchically lower intentions and beliefs with her plan of life, the hierarchically most prior set of intentions and beliefs. In the second stage an agent must choose an adequate plan of life for herself, which can be chosen only when the agent is fully aware of various alternative life plans and has given each serious consideration for adoption. The injunction that an agent should be engaged in the two stages of critical deliberation in order to be procedurally autonomous is termed the Principle of Procedural Autonomy. This principle is an ethical principle that is hierarchically prior to moral principles, and it is a procedural principle which is primarily concerned with how one should act rather than what ends should be attained. ;I conclude by applying the Principle of Procedural Autonomy to the debate concerning moral maturity of rational agents in which certain feminist objections have been raised against the concept of autonomy; I argue that procedural autonomy escapes their criticism. ;In developing my position I consider Kant and Aristotle, and a number of contemporary thinkers including J. Rawls, M. Bratman, D. Parfit, B. Williams, C. Gilligan and N. Noddings, among others