Abstract

This dissertation is a study of John Stuart Mill's Theism essay, the third of his Three Essays on Religion, published posthumously 1873. In contrast to Mill's other much-studied works, his writings in the philosophy of religion have received comparatively scant attention. Commentators have disagreed over the significance of the Theism essay, especially in the light of Mill's own description of himself in his Autobiography as one who never had any religious views. Theism, the longest and most philosophical of the three essays, was written around 1869/70 at the time when the ethics of belief debate was just getting underway in Great Britain. Though Mill remained aloof from active participation in this important intellectual movement, the Theism essay takes up several issues that were central to its agenda. ;My study examines the essay from the perspective of Mill's religious epistemology. The thesis I propose to defend is that NMI considers theism to be a justified theory, but that because of the specific kind of hypothesis theism is---what we would today call an inference to the best explanation---and because of the manner in which pragmatic considerations are involved, theism does not warrant epistemic belief but rather rational acceptance, which Mill calls 'hope.' Furthermore, Mill understands rational acceptance non-dispositionally and justified by truth-dependent pragmatic reasons. It is also part of my aim to offer some critical assessment of how well various details of this position work together toward a coherent religious epistemology. ;The most original aspect of Mill's position is his analysis of hope, and not, as for many commentators, his notion of a finite God or his well-known critique of omnipotence. Rational hope has traditionally been thought to consist of an estimate or probability component and a desiderative or pragmatic component. The Theism essay appears to be broadly organized around these two elements, Mill devoting considerably more attention to the desiderative aspect. ;My study consists of seven chapters. In Chapter One I present various alternative accounts of the genesis of the essay. In Chapter Two I present a bibliographical review of previous significant study of the Theism essay and relate the historical setting and reception of the work. I also suggest possible alternative readings of the work. Chapters Three and Four examine Mill's critique of various theistic proofs, the fourth chapter being devoted exclusively to the design argument. Chapter Five examines Mill's theory of the divine attribute of benevolence. Chapter Six discusses the role Mill considers immortality and the rejection of miracles to play in making divine benevolence a desiderative factor in the rational acceptance of theism. In Chapter Seven I elaborate on several features of Mill's notion of hope, especially on how Mill views the logical relationship between evidentialism and pragmatic reasons for acceptance. In a final, concluding section I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of Mill's position. The greatest difficulty I see facing NMI's position is that his own moral psychology of the win and desire lacks a sufficiently strong volitional basis which seems to be required for a workable belief/acceptance distinction. Consequently, there is room to doubt whether Mill can avail himself of the position he defends as rationally justifiable