Abstract

States face many challenges to their territorial boundaries, but moral theory currently does not provide satisfactory standards for evaluating these conflicts. This dissertation seeks to contribute to the debate about the moral foundations of state territory by analysing three philosophical traditions---Lockean property theory, Kantian theories of justice, and theories of democratic community. Potential Native American claims for secession from the United States are used as illustrative cases throughout. The dissertation begins with an analysis of existing international law on territory, arguing that the legal principles of territorial integrity, self-determination, and uti possidetis are mutually inconsistent. It then evaluates the potential role of Lockean property rights in justifying state territory, concluding that Lockean property rights are insufficiently strong to justify many state claims, and that real states rarely hold such rights. The dissertation then explores Immanuel Kant's justification of state authority, concluding that it is best regarded as a theory of coercible Good Samaritanism. This justification of authority provides some useful standards for evaluating state boundaries, suggesting that boundaries are most justified for states that fare well in protecting rights. The final third of the dissertation evaluates both democratic and "national" arguments for territorial self-determination, concluding that territorial change is often justified on democratic grounds, and more strongly justified when vulnerable cultural minorities are involved. The dissertation concludes with a general model of state territory, suggesting that boundaries are primarily justified by the function of states in protecting rights, but that a strong secondary role exists for self-determination, with a tertiary role for individual property rights