The Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability
Dissertation, Princeton University (
1993)
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Abstract
Very roughly, the conditional construal of conditional probability is the hypothesis that the conditional probability P equals the probability of the conditional 'if A, then B'. My main purposes are to hone this rough statement down to various precise versions of the Hypothesis, as I call it, and to argue that virtually none of them is tenable. ;In S 1, I distinguish four versions of the Hypothesis. The subsequent four sections are largely an opinionated historical survey, tracing the motivations for and origins of the Hypothesis, and its fluctuating fortunes. By the end of S 5, the first version has been shown to be refuted, and the second version moribund. ;My own negative results against the Hypothesis begin in S 6. I first generalize Lewis' so-called 'second triviality result', adding insult to injury as far as the second version is concerned. S 7 refutes the third version of the Hypothesis, and casts serious doubt on the fourth, or so I argue. I then consider four ways in which the Hypothesis could be resurrected. In S 8, I refute the first of these ways, and strengthen some old results; and in S 9 I argue against the other three ways. ;In S 10, I contend that philosophers have been in the grip of a dogma: that conditional probability is to be univocally analyzed by the usual ratio formula. I offer a positive proposal, which I call 'the ambiguity thesis': so-called 'conditional probability' is ambiguous between the usual ratio formula, and the probability of a conditional. The demise of the Hypothesis shows that these two disambiguations cannot be identified