Abstract
Why wasn’t Hume a sceptic about matters of taste? He was a thoroughgoing sceptic about fundamental matters in traditional metaphysics, such as cause, causal necessitation, inductive inferences, the self, even external objects. Yet, without exception, Hume’s aesthetics is read as abruptly reversing his sceptical position and promoting a timeless and objective standard for judging beauty. I reject the dominant approach for displacing the gains of his scepticism. To impute to Hume knowledge of a standard that depends essentially on a relation to certain persons makes him sound more like an idealist than an empiricist philosopher with naturalistic leanings. Instead, I read his aesthetic naturalism against the background of his sceptical commitments, by reconstructing his dilemma of taste along the lines of his general scepticism about cause. I argue that he deduces ‘that’ an unknown standard is operative, but in a qualified sense not ruled out by his scepticism