The Irrelevance of the Diachronic Money-Pump Argument for Acyclicity

Journal of Philosophy 110 (8):460–464 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The money-pump argument is the standard argument for the acyclicity of rational preferences. The argument purports to show that agents with cyclic preferences are in some possible situations forced to act against their preference. In the usual, diachronic version of the money-pump argument, such agents accept a series of trades that leaves them worse off than before. Two stock objections are (i) that one may get the drift and refuse the trades and (ii) that one may adopt a plan to only accept some of the trades. This article argues that these objections are irrelevant. If the diachronic money-pump argument is cogent, so is a more direct synchronic argument. The upshot is that the standard objections to the diachronic money-pump argument do not affect this simpler synchronic argument. Hence the standard objections to the money-pump argument for acyclicity are irrelevant.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Money Pump Is Necessarily Diachronic.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2014 - Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin/Philosophy.
Money Pumps, Diachronic and Synchronic.Yair Levy - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:XX.
A Deluxe Money Pump.Tom Dougherty - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):21-29.
Cashing out the money-pump argument.Chrisoula Andreou - 2016 - Philosophical Studies (6):1-5.
Money-Pump Arguments.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Money Pumps, Incompleteness, and Indeterminacy.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):60-72.
Money Pumps and Diachronic Books.Isaac Levi - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S235-S247.
Money pumps and diachronic books.Isaac Levi - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S235-S247.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-14

Downloads
130 (#144,570)

6 months
20 (#138,728)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Johan E. Gustafsson
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references