Movements, Actions, the Internal, & Hauser Robots

Behavior and Philosophy 22 (1):29 - 33 (1994)
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Abstract

Gunderson allows that internally propelled programmed devices (Hauser Robots) do act full-bloodedly under aspects but denies this evidences that they really have the mental properties such acts seem to indicate. Rather, given our intuitive conviction that these machines lack consciousness, such performances evidence the dementalizability (contrary to Searle and Hauser both) of full-blooded acts of detecting, calculating, etc., such machines really do (contrary to Searle) perform.

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Keith Gunderson
University of Minnesota

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