Abstract

In this dissertation I evaluate the treatment given to minorities in an ideal society ruled by justice as fairness, John Rawls' theory of justice. I find that, though Rawls claims that his theory of justice offers a strictly political treatment of the different comprehensive notions of the good involved in a disagreement in modern societies, his strong separation between the ethical and the political and his resting on the liberal institutions, including the citizenship, make this theory a way to completely liberalize the whole social life. Such separation and institutions do not allow real processes of recognition of the identity of some minorities, to which part of the problem is the lack of this recognition. Instead of spaces for direct recognition among contending parties of a disagreement, Rawls proposes a 'post-metaphysical' version of the Kantian moral personality, perfectly compatible with the liberal discursive practices. I contend that this proposal would be refused by different cultural and religious minorities, as well as ascriptive identity-based groups because it constrains their own political and social rationality and postpone the real processes of political reconciliation. This refusal, on the other hand, results fatal for Rawls' claim to obtain for his theory the endorsement of these minorities, which is the final pragmatic appeal of his theory. ;In my presentation of this statement, I deal with some of the most recent critiques of Kantian theories like Jurgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Iris Marion Young, Will Kymlicka, Georgia Warnke, and Axel Honneth, among others.