Plantinga, Foundationalism, and the Charge of Self-referential Incoherence

Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1):187-193 (1988)
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Abstract

Alvin Plantinga charges classical foundationalism with self-referential incoherence, meaning that that doctrine employs criteria for rationally acceptable propositions which exclude the criteria themselves. More specifically, the charge is that the criteria are neither properly basic nor supported by properly basic propositions. In section 1 the doctrine of classical foundationalism is briefly explained. In section 2, a defense against Plantinga's objection is provided showing how the foundationalist can provide arguments which ground the criteria in question in properly basic propositions.

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John Greco
Georgetown University

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