Abstract

In Physics B 1, Aristotle establishes a detailed definition of phýsis. For that purpose, Aristotle distinguishes phýsisfrom téchnē and his domain. He did this to offer a satisfactory account of the physical being. In this process, phýsis is defined as an immanent principle of movement and as matter and as form. As matter phýsis could be understood as “the primary underlying matter in each case, of things which have in themselves a source of their movements and changes”. To consider phýsis as form Aristotle appeals to four arguments where priority of form over matter appears to be evident and where the identifying of eîdos/morphé with tò télos/tò hoû héneka will be crucial, especially for later developments. The reconstruction of Aristotle’s reasoning on his definition of phýsis in Physics B 1 emphasizing the problems that such effort of definition implies is the purpose of this paper.