Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):69-75 (2006)
AbstractThe derivation of the generally held Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), roughly you are morally responsible only if you could do otherwise, from an even more generally held moral principle, K (for Kant), that roughly speaking ought implies can, has recently been the focus of significant debate. In this paper I shall argue that by focusing on PAP interpreted in terms of commissions alone an alternative derivation of PAP interpreted in terms of omissions is being overlooked. The advantage of the new derivation is that it avoids many of the criticisms directed at the original derivation. Key Words: alternative possibilities blameworthiness moral responsibility omissions.
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