More on blameworthiness and alternative possibilities

Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):69-75 (2006)
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The derivation of the generally held Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), roughly ‘you are morally responsible only if you could do otherwise’, from an even more generally held moral principle, K (for Kant), that roughly speaking ‘ought implies can’, has recently been the focus of significant debate. In this paper I shall argue that by focusing on PAP interpreted in terms of commissions alone an alternative derivation of PAP interpreted in terms of omissions is being overlooked. The advantage of the new derivation is that it avoids many of the criticisms directed at the original derivation. Key Words: alternative possibilities • blameworthiness • moral responsibility • omissions.



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G. C. Goddu
University of Richmond

Citations of this work

“Ought implies can” & missed care.Alan J. Kearns - 2020 - Nursing Philosophy 21 (1):e12272.

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
The Kantian versus Frankfurt.A. Blum - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):287-288.

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