What is right with 'bayes net methods' and what is wrong with 'hunting causes and using them'?

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):161-211 (2010)
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Abstract

Nancy Cartwright's recent criticisms of efforts and methods to obtain causal information from sample data using automated search are considered. In addition to reviewing that effort, I argue that almost all of her criticisms are false and rest on misreading, overgeneralization, or neglect of the relevant literature

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Clark Glymour
Carnegie Mellon University

References found in this work

Nature's capacities and their measurement.Nancy Cartwright - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Critical Notices.Nancy Cartwright - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):244-249.

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