La lutte violente entre les parties de la vérité

Revue Internationale de Philosophie 272 (2):183-203 (2015)
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Abstract

Mill’s claim that representative government can be democratic, and as such “the ideally best form of government”, rests on the virtues of public deliberation, which he sees both as a means for pursuing just political decisions and as a means of participation for the widest citizenry. His view has been criticized, by Schmitt in particular, for assuming that free discussion can dissolve the conflict of social forces and that it leads to the discovery of the truth. But does it really depend on such premises? The focus of the paper is the tension between the search for truth and the need for inclusion in Mill’s theory of representative government. An examination of the role played by freedom of discussion suggests that far from sublimating social conflict or guaranteeing the correctness of political decisions, the deliberative process regulates the conflict of opinions, understood as a violent struggle over truth, on an egalitarian basis.

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Charles Girard
Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University

Citations of this work

Democracy and Truth: A Contingent Defense of Epistemic Democracy.Gustavo Hessmann Dalaqua - 2017 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 29 (1):49-71.
Conflict, consensus, and liberty in J. S. Mill’s representative democracy.Gustavo Hessmann Dalaqua - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (1):110-130.

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