Abstract

This paper reconsiders Frank Ramsey's essay on subjective probability (1926) as a consistent way to articulate logic, rationality and knowledge. The first part of the essay builds an axiomatic theory of subjective probability based on ‘formal logic’, defining rationality as choice-consistency. The second part seems to open up different horizons: the evaluation of degrees of belief by ‘human logic’. Because of the interest Keynes (1931) had taken in ‘human logic’, it was considered to be a possible alternative to the formal logic underlying the neoclassical theory of individual behaviour. The analysis of Ramsey's method in the entire paper, the relation between logic and rationality it constructs and the conception of uncertainty it reveals, lead me to note on the contrary that Ramsey's human logic was a complementary logic rather than an alternative to formal logic. Defining a standard to evaluate beliefs formation according to a frequentist criterion, it completes a normative representation of rationality which supports an original theory of knowledge that appears more in line with further developments of neoclassical methodology than with Keynesian economics.