Visual Prominence and Representationalism

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418 (2013)
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Abstract

A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.

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Author Profiles

Todd Ganson
Oberlin College
Ben Bronner
George Washington University

Citations of this work

Perceptual precision.Adrienne Prettyman - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):923-944.
Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.
Range content, attention, and the precision of representation.Trey Boone - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1141-1161.

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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.

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