Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418 (2013)
AbstractA common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Citations of this work
Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief.Thomas Raleigh & Filippo Vindrola - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):378-406.
Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.
Range Content, Attention, and the Precision of Representation.Trey Boone - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1141-1161.
Similar books and articles
The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience.Michael Tye - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
Is There More to Visual Attention Than Meets the Eye?Cyril Latimer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):690-691.
Visual Attention, Conceptual Content, and Doing It Right.Wayne Wu - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):1003-1033.
Environmental Representationalists on Afterimages and Phosphenes: Putting Our Best Foot Forward.Robert Schroer - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):531-546.
Representationalism and the Scene-Immediacy of Visual Experience: A Journey to the Fringe and Back.Robert Schroer - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595 - 615.
Representationalism About Consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.
Separate Neural Definitions of Visual Consciousness and Visual Attention: A Case for Phenomenal Awareness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2004 - Neural Networks 17 (5):861-872.
Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 209-235.
Electrophysiological Correlates of Visual Consciousness and Selective Attention.Mika Koivisto & Antti Revonsuo - 2007 - Neuroreport 18 (8):753-756.
Competition for Consciousness Among Visual Events: The Psychophysics of Reentrant Visual Processes.Vincent Di Lollo, James T. Enns & Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General 129 (4):481-507.
Comment on Competition for Consciousness Among Visual Events: The Psychophysics of Reentrant Visual Processes (di Lollo, Enns & Rensink, 2000).Gregory Francis & Frouke Hermens - 2002 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 131 (4):590-593.