Mind 100 (2):221-236 (
1991)
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Abstract
Any number of criticisms of Kant's moral psychology are directed at his claims
that actions possessing moral worth must be performed "irrespective of all
objects of the faculty of desire" (G 68,400),' and that actions done from duty must
"set aside altogether the influence of inclination, and along with inclination every
object of the will" (ibid). Rather than desire or inclination, it is "pure reverence
for the law" that moves the will in actions done from duty (G 69,401). My present
purpose is to defend Kant's view as a plausible tenet of moral psychology by
defending it against two lines of criticism. I shall conclude by considering some
moral theoretic objections to Kant's view. In so doing I hope to provide a clearer
understanding of Kant's position on moral motivation.