Berkeley, meaning and minds: Remarks on glezakos' comments

Philosophia 37 (3):409-413 (2009)
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Abstract

This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict, and (3) whether the texts support my reading.

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Melissa Frankel
Carleton University

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