Identity, Personhood and the Law: Charles Foster and Jonathan Herring. Springer, 2017: ISBN 978-3-319-53458-9: 70 pp [Book Review]

Journal of Medical Ethics Recent Issues 44 (1) (2017)
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Abstract

The law tends to think that there is no difficulty about identifying humans. When someone is born, her name is entered into a statutory register. She is ‘X’ in the eyes of the law. At some point, ‘X’ will die and her name will be recorded in another register. If anyone suggested that the second X was not the same as the first, the suggestion would be met with bewilderment. During X's lifetime, the civil law assumed that the X who entered into a contract was the same person who breached it. The criminal law assumed that X, at the age of 80, was liable for criminal offences ‘she’ committed at the age of 18. This accords with the way we talk. ‘She's not herself today’, we say; or ‘When he killed his wife he wasn't in his right mind’. The intuition has high authority: ‘To thine own self...

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Identity, personhood and the law: a response to Ashcroft and McGee.Charles Foster & Jonathan Herring - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics Recent Issues 44 (1):73-74.

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