Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (2):255-271 (2010)

Brian Flanagan
Maynooth University
Many theorists take the view that literal meaning can be one of a number of factors to be weighed in reaching a legal interpretation. Still others regard literal meaning as having the potential to legally justify a particular outcome. Building on the scholarly response to HLA Hart’s famous ‘vehicles in the park’ hypothetical, this article presents a formal argument that literal meaning cannot be decisive of what’s legally correct, one which, unusually, makes no appeal to controversial theories within philosophy of language or literary criticism. If the argument is sound, it follows that an enactment’s literal meaning neither weighs in the determination of correct legal outcomes nor permits the application of a sequencing model, ie a non-monotonic logic, to its interpretation. These implications are considerably more controversial within contemporary legal theory than the idea that a statute’s literal meaning is not necessarily its legal meaning. Yet we see that, given an intuitive notion of legal truth, they follow from it nonetheless
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DOI 10.1093/ojls/gqp030
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Same-Sex Marriage and the Spanish Constitution: The Linguistic-Legal Meaning Interface.Rina Villars - 2017 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 30 (2):273-300.

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