Van Inwagen on free will

Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):252-260 (1986)
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I discuss van inwagen's "first formal argument" for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise. I distinguish different interpretations of the important notion, "s can render p false." I argue that on none of these interpretations is the argument clearly sound. I point to gaps in the argument, Although I do not claim that it is unsound



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John Fischer
University of California, Riverside

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Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.
Anomalous monism.Steven Yalowitz - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On what we can ensure.Benjamin Schnieder - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):101 - 115.

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