The Moral Objection to Modal Realism

Erkenntnis 82 (5):1015-1030 (2017)
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Abstract

If David Lewis's modal realism is true, then there are many, many people. According to Mark Heller, this is bad news. He takes modal realism (MR) to imply that "there are at least some cases in which it is permissible to let drowning children drown when it would be easy to save them." But since he holds the reasonable view that this is never permissible, he thinks that MR is false. Here, I argue that Lewis needn't be troubled by this objection, and that it provides no reason to reject MR for those who share Lewis's moral outlook. Moreover, I argue that disagreement with common sense needn't be severe if we can show both (a) that there's a sense in which common sense is correct and (b) we have little reason to care about the sense in which common sense is mistaken.

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Bob Fischer
Texas State University

Citations of this work

Modal Realism is a Newcomb Problem.Scott Hill - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2993-3005.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Theories and things.W. V. Quine (ed.) - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
Theories of actuality.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1974 - Noûs 8 (3):211-231.

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