American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):213-223 (2009)
AbstractThe claim that moral responsibility requires relevant alternative possibilities is encapsulated by the following principle: PAP: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In 1969 Harry Frankfurt devised what purported to be a counterexample to PAP: Suppose someone, Black, let us say, wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he, Black, wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he, Black, wants him to do. Whatever Jones's initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his way. . . . Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Citations of this work
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument.Daniel James Speak - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.
Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.
Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge.Gerald Harrison - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):273-282.
The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument.John Martin Fischer - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):464–471.
Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style-Cases.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - In M. Betzler & B. Guckes (eds.), Autonomes Handeln: Beitrage Zur Philosophie von Harry G. Frankfurt. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.