A Deflationary Response to the Ontological Problem
Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago (
1995)
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Abstract
This dissertation sets out to defend the coherence approach to justification against a standard objection. The objection is that such an approach cannot establish a connection between being justified on the one hand and being true on the other hand--that is, that no coherence theory of justification can satisfactorily solve "the Ontological Problem". In the course of the argument, I develop what I take to be the most plausible version of the coherence theory of justification. ;Many coherentists have interpreted these truth connection objections as requiring the establishment of a connection with a substantive truth property . I survey some notable attempts to carry out this project by those holding a coherence theory of justification. Included are an advocate of the coherence theory of truth and a proponent of correspondence truth . These attempts fail in part because the truth property, as interpreted by these philosophers, introduces insurmountable problems. ;Contrary to such substantive truth theorists, I am sympathetic to the view that truth is not a complex property. Once we accept a deflationary view of truth, solving the Ontological Problem becomes a matter of responding to two specific objections to coherence theories: the Isolation Objection and the Plurality Objection. At the end of the dissertation, I outline what I take to be the correct response to these objections. In response to the former, I argue that coherence considerations ensure that observation statements will be included in any coherent system of belief, and thus, that coherence justification is not "cut off from the world". Finally, I argue that the possibility of multiple, equally justified theories is not unique to the coherence theory of justification, and thus, does not in itself present a reason for rejecting the coherence theory in favor of any other theory of justification. Further, I claim that coherence considerations are capable of narrowing theory choice, but insisting that a theory of justification pick out a unique system is not desirable