Against levels of reality: the method of metaphysics and the argument for dualism

In Meir Hemmo, Stavros Ioannidis, Orly Shenker & Gal Vishne (eds.), Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy: Re-Examining the Multi-Level Structure of Reality. Springer (2022)
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Abstract

This paper has three objectives: arguing against levels of reality by employing the Lewis-Jackson method for doing metaphysics, also known as the Canberra plan; showing how this method renders the idea of levels of reality incoherent, but nevertheless leaves the conceptual space open for dualism; sketching out a concrete proposal for a dualism of mind and matter that relies on normativity and that employs ontic structural realism.

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Michael Esfeld
University of Lausanne

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