The rationality debate from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):671-671 (2000)
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Abstract

A problem with Stanovich & West's inference that there a nonintellectual processing system independent from an intellectual one from data in which they partialled out global intelligence is that they may have controlled for the wrong kind of intellectual intelligence. Research on cognitive-experiential self-theory over the past two decades provides much stronger support for two independent processing systems.

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