Unawareness and Implicit Belief

Abstract

Possible worlds models of belief have difficulties accounting for unawareness, the inability to entertain (and hence believe) certain propositions. Accommodating unawareness is important for adequately modelling epistemic states, and representing the informational content to which agents have in principle access given their explicit beliefs. In this paper, I develop a model of explicit belief, awareness, and informational content, along with an sound and complete axiomatisation. I furthermore defend the model against the seminal impossibility result of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini, according to which three intuitive conditions preclude non-trivial unawareness on any possible worlds model of belief.

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-25

Downloads
163 (#74,209)

6 months
23 (#38,551)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Edward J. R. Elliott
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Revisionist Reporting.Kyle Blumberg & Harvey Lederman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):755-783.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Syntactic Foundations for Unawareness of Theorems.Spyros Galanis - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):593-614.
Standard State Space Models of Unawareness.Peter Fritz & Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 15.
Multi-Task Agency with Unawareness.Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):197-222.
Impossible Worlds and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.
A Logic for Reasoning About Knowledge of Unawareness.Thomas Ågotnes & Natasha Alechina - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):197-217.
A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction.John Cantwell - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):303-329.
A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction.John Cantwell - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):397-422.