The Function of Knowledge

Analysis 81 (1):100-107 (2021)
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Abstract

Human beings are epistemically interdependent. Much of what we know and much of what we need to know we glean from others. Being a gregarious bunch, we are prone to venturing opinions whether they are warranted or not. This makes information transfer a tricky business. What we want from others is not just information, but reliable information. When we seek information, we are in the position of enquirers not examiners. We ask someone whether p because we do not ourselves already know whether p. So we cannot check our informant’s bona fides by seeing whether she is speaking the truth about p. We need grounds for trust. In What’s the Point of Knowledge? Michael Hannon maintains that this is the predicament that underlies the concept of knowledge. The we here is comprehensive. Evidently, every language has a word for knowledge. This, Hannon suggests, indicates that the concept of knowledge satisfies a universal human need. A goal, if not the goal, of epistemology is to identify that need and ascertain how it is satisfied. Following Craig, Hannon argues that the point of knowledge is to enable us to identify good – that is, suitably reliable – informants. Let us call this the information transfer view.

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Catherine Elgin
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Who knows what? Epistemic dependence, inquiry, and function-first epistemology.Joshua DiPaolo - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Reply to Gardiner and DiPaolo.Michael Hannon - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
"Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University

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References found in this work

Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.
Epistemic scorekeeping.Patrick Rysiew - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Mark of a Good Informant.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (3):319-331.
Book reviews. [REVIEW]Frederick F. Schmitt - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):555-559.

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