Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2011)
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Abstract

Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.

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Douglas Ehring
Southern Methodist University

Citations of this work

Grounding and the argument from explanatoriness.David Mark Kovacs - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):2927-2952.
A Bundle Theory of Words.J. T. M. Miller - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5731–5748.
Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore, Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1.

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