Abstract

In Making Sense of Nietzsche, Richard Schacht articulates an interpretative approach to Nietzsche's work that, in his view, defends it from various forms of intellectual misuse and misunderstanding. As Schacht sees it, the latter stem from an overreaction to the apocalyptic tone of Nietzsche's attack on traditional religion, morality, and philosophy. Against such readings, he demands that Nietzsche be taken seriously as a philosopher with defensible views on a variety of matters of the first importance: the nature and history of philosophy, the theory of value, epistemology and the philosophy of science, art, and philosophical anthropology. Obviously, we cannot appreciate Nietzsche's views on these topics if we dismiss him as a crank. Nor can we do so if we embrace him as a purely destructive thinker who seeks to undermine our confidence in the very possibility of rational inquiry. Schacht's Nietzsche therefore defends the viability of philosophical investigation by reinterpreting its character. He understands the conviction that the rationality of such investigation demands our utter detachment from the actual conditions of meaningful inquiry as the expression of our human, all too human hatred of the perspectival nature of experience. His rejection of the traditional ideal of rational detachment, however, does not entail the rejection of the possibility of inquiry per se. On the contrary. According to Schacht, Nietzsche believes we are only now in a position finally to understand how real investigation of the subjects that matter to us is possible at all.