Abstract
This book consists of four major papers written by Peter Achinstein, Peter Geach, Wesley Salmon, and J. L. Mackie. Each of the papers has two commentaries. Achinstein’s paper is commented on by Mary Hesse and R. Harré; Geach’s paper, by Peter Winch and Grete Henry; Salmon’s paper, by D. H. Mellor and L. Jonathan Cohen; Mackie’s paper, by Renford Bambrough and Martin Hollis. Each author of the original paper then replies to his two commentators. All four papers are concerned with some aspect of the concept of explanation. Achinstein’s and Salmon’s papers are extensions and justifications of their previous work. For example, Salmon has argued against Hempel’s account of scientific explanation and has maintained that certain scientific explanations are not arguments of any kind, and that consequently they need not embody the high probabilities that would be required to provide reasonable ground for expectation of the event to be explained. He argues instead that a statistical explanation of a particular event "consists of an assemblage of factors relevant to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event to be explained, along with the associated probability values". He indicates in the present volume that he does not wish to create the impression "that ability to transmit a mark is any mysterious kind of necessary connection or ‘power’ of the sort Hume criticized in Locke". There is little likelihood that Salmon would be misconstrued in this way. Also there is recent literature to the effect that Locke was clearer on the issues of causality than Hume and that there is nothing "mysterious" in Locke’s notion of powerful particulars. Why are they any more mysterious than the passive particulars preferred by Humeans?