William James and What Cannot be Believed

The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79 (2005)
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Abstract

My critical comments focus mainly on premises,, and. However, in treating these I will address other of James’s assumptions—particularly, the presupposition of his argument that it is possible to will to believe. Later I will try to accommodate existential aspects of James’s argument that retain value, even if my objections to his argument stand.

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original Adler, Jonathan E. (2005) "William James and What Cannot be Believed". The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13(1):65-79

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Citations of this work

Conceptual evidentialism.Inga Nayding - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.
Indirect evaluative voluntarism.Alex Horne - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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