Professor Lejewski is opposed to the idea that the ontological commitments of an individual, or of a theory, are to be gauged by the existential assertions made by the former, or by the existential statements provable in the latter. Here, of course

In J. P. Cleave & Stephan Körner (eds.), Philosophy of Logic: Papers and Discussions. University of California Press. pp. 28 (1976)
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