Abstract

Our political and theoretical discourses reserve an important place for the interrelated concepts of autonomy freedom and responsibility. Furthermore, these concepts invoke an entire family of supporting concepts and assumptions. Unfortunately, this family of concepts has found itself fractured by the contemporary critique of the subject. After analyzing this family of concepts, the dissertation draws inspiration from the works of Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger to begin the task of reconstruction. Their inspiration opens a consideration of time and space which fleshes out an understanding of the person as project. Using that understanding, the dissertation returns to the concepts of autonomy, freedom and responsibility to reconstruct them as activities within the person's lived experience of time and space. ;The analysis of these three concepts uncovers the connections between them and their common assumptions. Autonomy has two dominant meanings: self-determination and self-realization. Freedom appears in positive and negative formulations. And, responsibility expresses the blameworthiness of an actor for an outcome. In each case, the individual must maintain priority over its context. Unfortunately, this priority has found itself undermined by contemporary critiques of subjectivity. ;For inspiration to redress these problems, the dissertation turns to the writings of Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger. This inspiration opens a discussion of space and time from the continuous moment of activity. Through this understanding, we escape the dilemma of the individual and its conditions. ;Ultimately, the dissertation returns to the problem of autonomy, freedom and responsibility. The ontological analysis of the temporal categories in the immediate now provides an understanding of the context for activity. With this understanding, the dissertation reconstructs the concepts of autonomy, freedom and responsibility. Autonomy is the activity of self-direction within the presence of the past, the space of human experience. Responsibility appears as the activity of responsiveness in the present of the immediate now. And, freedom is the negation of the past and present in the presence of the future. These reconstructions avoid the dilemma found in contemporary accounts of the individual