There is a word for that kind of thing: An investigation of two thought experiments

Philosophical Perspectives 7:155-171 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.2307/2214120

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,932

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Two ways of being a (direct) referentialist.Andrea Bianchi - 2011 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), Having In Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 79-92.
Thought experiments: Reply to Donnellan.Taylor Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
On the Origins of the Philosophy of Thought Experiments: The Forerun.Yiftach Fehige & Michael T. Stuart - 2014 - Perspectives on Science 22 (2):179-220.
What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):741-759.
Review. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 2008 - Theoria 54 (3):220-237.
Donnellan's Misdescriptions and Loose Talk.Carlo Penco - 2017 - In Maria De Ponte Kepa Korta (ed.), Reference and Representation in Language and Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 104-125.
Semantic analysis of natural kind terms.Harry Deutsch - 1994 - Topoi 13 (1):25-30.
From Having in Mind to Direct Reference.Antonio Capuano - 2012 - In Kabasenche - O'Rourke - Slater (ed.), Reference and Referring. MIT Press. pp. 189-208.
An Idea of Donnellan.David Kaplan - 2011 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), Having In Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 122-175.
Having In Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan.Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.) - 2011 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
146 (#128,458)

6 months
11 (#339,306)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism.Åsa Wikforss - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):158-181.
Can we believe what we do not understand?François Recanati - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):84-100.
Was Heidegger an externalist?Cristina Lafont - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):507 – 532.
From constitutional necessities to causal necessities.Jessica Wilson - 2010 - In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. New York: Routledge.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references