Abstract

Martin-Löf’s type theory stems simultaneously from Frege and Russell’s logic-ontological ideas and Husserl’s phenomenology. The article examines this intermediate status of type theory using as examples Martin-Löf ’s syntactical-semantic method and the role of evidence and canonical objects in his approach. Martin-Löf borrows the syntactical-semantic method from Frege and extends it drawing on Husserl’s theory of meaning. In type theory this method leads to the identity (isomorphism) of syntax and semantics (formal logic and formal ontology). Unlike traditional formal logic the type theory is an interpreted system from the very beginning. Being intuitionistic, Martin-Löf ’s theory is based on the notion of proof, not truth. From the meaning theory point of view, it is a variant of proof-theoretic semantics (Gentzen, Prawitz, Dummett) which understands meaning as an object constructed according to certain rules. So understood, the proof is based on evidence, which allows us to associate it with the theory of intentionality by Husserl. The article compares Martin-Löf ’s type theory with Husserl’s intentionality theory, especially with the latter’s noematic component. We may consider type-theoretical rules for constructing objects and operating with them as a concretization and formalization of the phenomenological notion of noema. Both are explications of the more general concept of meaning. The article discusses the interrelation between notions of sense and meaning (Sinn, Bedeutung) in Frege, Husserl and Martin-Löf. This reveals the uncertainty of Martin-Löf ’s position in relation to meaning theories of Frege and Husserl.