Abstract

The idea that the present is "ontologically privileged" can be traced back to texts as early as St. Augustine's Confessions and Aristotle's Physics. The issue of the ontological status of tense continues to set the agenda in contemporary philosophy of time, which is dominated by two views. Proponents of the Tenseless View argue that all events are, in the timeless sense of 'are', equally real. Defenders of the rival Tensed View maintain that only present events are real, and that the reality of tense is the essence of time. The first two chapters of the dissertation are devoted to the presentation and study of these, on the face of it, mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive metaphysical theories of time. The aim of the analysis is, on the one hand, to highlight the insights that are motivating these theories and that are captured by them; on the other, it is to establish that neither theory can be squared with features of the language which it presupposes, and that, therefore, both have to be rejected. ;Uncovering and undermining the metaphysical prejudices shared by both views, in particular, the supposition that 'Real or not?' is the right question to pose with respect to tense, paves the way to the central thesis that occupies the second part of the dissertation. Crudely put, it is that the ingredients for the construction of a philosophically adequate conception of time are found, not among the products of metaphysical doctrines, but in the everyday uses we make of temporal notions. In the third chapter, a discussion of the indispensability of contexts for the use of temporal terms constitutes the beginning of the argument in support of this thesis. In chapter four an analysis of the philosophical role of tense-based biases in our attitudes concludes the argument, and yields a list of the main tools with which one can construct a conception of time out of everyday situations and the language employed in them. Chapter five consists of a demonstration of the application of these tools for the elucidation of notions such as 'the openness of the future', 'the fixity of the past' and 'time's passage' . Among the conclusions of this discussion is the suggestion that notions with which to further develop and enrich our conception of time may be obtained by the formation and participation in practices created for this end