Abstract

This dissertation offers a compatibilist solution to the apparent conflict--illustrated by the "slippery slope" argument from occasional to universal exculpation--between sufficient causal explanations of human actions, and moral responsibility. In reply to traditional compatibilist solutions, recent incompatibilists have insisted that, if even our desires are caused, we cannot do otherwise than we actually do, and are therefore not responsible. ;Dennett's compatibilist response is a "naturalistic" account of the conditions necessary for responsibility--e.g., rationality and control--which assumes the truth of determinism. His boldest move is one of his replies to the recent incompatibilist argument: even if determinism is true, we can do otherwise in the sense that more than one action is always epistemically possible. ;Chapter III proposes a criterion of responsibility for particular actions, based on our capacity for qualitative evaluations. The incompatibilist wrongly pictures us as helplessly following our desires, whereas we can in fact determine ourselves by controlling these desires. However, the hard determinist would insist that even this ability to control ourselves is ultimately due to genetic and environmental factors beyond our control. These factors are a matter of moral luck, and Dennett's notion of epistemic possibility does not address this problem. ;Nonetheless, Dennett's overall strategy concerning moral luck is successful. To attribute all actions to luck is to misuse the concept, and ignores the impact of our skill on our actions. However, Dennett's adoption of a utilitarian view of punishment and responsibility makes him vulnerable to the slippery slope argument. My criterion, in contrast, shows exactly when it is fair to excuse victims of bad moral luck. The influence of moral luck should not, however, be entirely dropped from our moral framework. ;Chapter V presents a retributive critique of a purely utilitarian view of punishment and responsibility. Most compatibilists have adopted a utilitarian view because of their inability to find a principled solution to the slippery slope argument. However, compatibilism is in fact quite consistent with a retributive view. This is shown by Strawson's discussion of reactive attitudes, and by my nonutilitarian solution to the slippery slope argument