Abstract

When it comes to metaphors, a philosopher may feel inclined to become a metaphorologist, which is to say, an expert of metaphors, in the sense of an expert of what metaphors are. A talented writer would rather become a skilled user of them. Plato is certainly both things. He says very little about metaphors. However, he uses plenty of them, virtually in all dialogues. Moreover, starting from a certain point of his literary production, Plato's metaphors become more relevant from a philosophical point of view. But when does this happen exactly, and how? Are there linguistic or stylometric criteria in the light of which we might distinguish between non-philosophical and philosophical metaphors? And, more in general, does it make any sense, from a Platonic point of view, to talk about philosophical metaphors? Needless to say, the bibliography on the topic is extensive. In my paper, I focus on Pender's reading of Plato's lexicon and imagery of likeness—which is an expression that Plato prefers over the word "metaphor" in order to refer to his own abundant variety of analogies, comparisons, examples, models, paradigms, and similes. Firstly, I consider whether it possible to attribute to the latter a definite cognitive role. I argue that there are cases in which Plato seems to regard metaphors as being even more informative than direct account of things. Secondly, I focus on Plato's metaphorical devices with an eye on the early dialogues, for the purpose of noting some of the salient steps of the evolution of their philosophical relevance. Thirdly, I consider the example of some metaphors that are born great: the ones that Plato uses for the gods and the soul, with which Pender deals, and also the wide landscape of Plato's metaphors of light.