Divine foreknowledge and human freedom: exploring a gap-theoretic account

Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-18 (2023)
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Abstract

The recent work of logician Jc Beall marks a paradigm shift within the fields of analytic theology and philosophy of religion. Thanks to Beall’s work, the long held (and generally unquestioned) assumption that theology is governed by (or closed under) the classical account of logic, is no longer free for the assumption. More importantly, by dropping this unquestioned commitment to the classical account, Beall’s work has uncovered natural and well-motivated solutions to some of monotheistic theologies’ most difficult and longstanding problems. That said, much of Beall’s work (and the work of others who have followed his lead) has been paraconsistent, utilizing glut-theoretic (contradictory) models to solve theologies problems. In this essay, my plan is to go paracomplete, with the aim of exploring a yet to be explored solution to the infamous foreknowledge and freedom problem. My solution finds its roots in the recent work Jc Beall and Aaron Cotnoir (‘God of the Gaps’, Analysis, 2017). Specifically, in this essay I will explore a gap-theoretic solution to the foreknowledge and freedom problem; one in which it is neither true nor false that God has foreknowledge. By utilizing Beall’s and Cotnoir’s model — which sees limit claims on God’s omni-properties as either just false or gappy — a natural and well-motivated solution to the foreknowledge and freedom problem emerges. Moreover, by utilizing the Beall-Cotnoir gap-theoretic model, not only is the foreknowledge and freedom problem circumvented, but an interesting and novel account of divine omniscience emerges.

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Mike DeVito
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

Gaps and god’s impeccability.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin & Michael DeVito - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.

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References found in this work

Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will.Robert Kane (ed.) - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logical Pluralism.J. C. Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.

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